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Abstract 
This paper discusses the question of whether or not the high incidence of 
poverty among immigrants in Norway persists even after immigrants have been in the 
country for a long period, that is, after they have had the opportunity to integrate and 
adapt their skills to the expectations in their new home. While similar to traditional 
studies of wage assimilation, a study of assimilation in relation to poverty propensity 
nevertheless measures something different than labor market assimilation, and this 
represents the main innovation of this study. Analysis of assimilation with respect to 
poverty focuses on welfare for the lower end of the income distribution and for all 
individuals, regardless of their relationship with the labor market. It can therefore be 
seen to better reflect the degree to which immigrants as a whole are able to achieve at 
least the minimum necessary to participate in the life of their new home and avoid 
difficulties later on.  
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1. Introduction 
Norway has long been regarded as a rich welfare state with relatively low 
income inequality and would therefore hardly seem the likely object for a study of 
poverty. However, a certain proportion of the Norwegian population does have a level 
of income so far below that of the rest of the population that participation in societal 
life most certainly is impaired. In some respects, the persistence of poverty in a 
country such as Norway can help us to isolate some of the particularly intractable 
factors which allow poverty to exist even in affluent welfare states. The percentage of 
poor among immigrants in Norway is much larger than the percentage in the native 
population so that immigrant status and ethnic origin may just help to explain to some 
degree the continuing existence of poverty in the country. However, the more crucial 
question is whether or not this rather high incidence of poverty among immigrants 
persists even after immigrants have been in the country for a long period, that is, after 
they have had the opportunity to integrate and adapt their skills to the expectations in 
their new home. 
If one considers both an immigrant’s initial adjustment difficulties and the 
different demographic composition of the immigrant population as compared to the 
native population, a difference in the likelihood for poverty in the immigrant and 
native population hardly seems surprising. If one can control for some major 
demographic differences, such as household composition, age and education, one 
would expect that an immigrant’s probability of being poor would be lower after he or 
she had been in the country for several years and had therefore been able to adapt and 
adjust to his or her new environment. One might even expect that, after a sufficiently 
long period of adaptation and integration, immigrants’ probability for poverty would 
converge to the level of the native population with the same or very similar 
demographic characteristics.  
A large number of labor market studies have addressed the issue of the wage 
assimilation of foreigners relative to native workers. Chiswick (1978) was the first to 
analyze wage assimilation for immigrants in the US and was able to discern a positive 
relationship between years in the country and wages relative to natives, but later 
studies have introduced various refinements on that main model. In particular, results 
in Borjas (1985) suggest that cross-sectional analysis, such as in Chiswick (1978), 
need not imply wage assimilation, but might rather be indicative of a decline in cohort 
quality among successive immigrant groups. The analysis in Borjas (1985) relies, in 
turn, on an implicit assumption of equal period effects for all immigrant cohorts, in 
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other words, that the effects of economic conditions were the same for natives and 
various immigrant cohorts during the entire period of investigation. A forthcoming 
Norwegian study (Barth, Bratsberg and Raaum (2004)) discusses how such an 
assumption can introduce biases in the measure of assimilation as well as cohort 
quality and introduces differential period effects embodied by local labor market 
conditions (unemployment) for immigrant and natives. That study indicates that failure 
to take into consideration different period effects results in an overestimation of 
differences in cohort quality as well as underestimation of wage assimilation for non-
OECD immigrants in Norway. While all of these refinements have resulted in 
differences in the interpretation of the extent to which wage assimilation has occurred, 
they do not reverse the general finding that some assimilation does in fact take place.  
 A certain degree of wage assimilation for foreigners in Norway has therefore 
been suggested by previous studies3 and such studies certainly give rise to 
expectations of a similar assimilation effect with regards to poverty. There are, 
however, some major differences between studies of wage assimilation and poverty 
that should be noted. Firstly, wage assimilation studies focus on the labor market 
success of individuals. The labor market difficulties of immigrants are hardly a new 
tale, so focusing on wages alone does not give us a complete picture of the welfare 
situation for immigrants without regular work. It also fails to take into account welfare 
issues for household members that do not participate in the labor market. In other 
words, wage assimilation does not provide us with the whole picture, because it leaves 
out many relevant variables, such as household composition and the actual number of 
wage earners in the household. Secondly, increasing success in escaping poverty does 
not have to mean that a large degree of wage assimilation has taken place nor that 
wage assimilation is the only cause of the decrease in poverty. It could be due to 
improved access to welfare programs or better access to low-paying jobs that 
nonetheless provide income just over the poverty line. While studying wage 
assimilation is very important for establishing the extent to which immigrants are able 
to improve their situation by their own means when they find employment, 
assimilation with respect to poverty propensity helps to establish the extent to which 
immigrants are able to avoid very low income in a manner similar to the native 
population. 
                                                 
3Hayfron (1998) and Longvå and Raaum (2002) as well as the forthcoming paper by Barth, Bratsberg 
and Raaum (2004) provide results from Norway. 
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Another phenomenon relevant in this context is assimilation with regards to 
participation in social assistance (welfare) programs or other forms of transfers, a topic 
which has started to gain some attention within the last decade. It may not be entirely 
clear just what assimilation means in such a context. If immigrants start out at a lower 
level of welfare participation than the native population, would assimilation mean 
increased participation over time or does assimilation means that immigrants’ are less 
reliant on welfare, regardless of how they compare to the native population? The 
crucial question in the literature seems to be whether higher or lower participation rates 
occur over time. Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) elegantly solve this semantic difficulty 
by speaking of increased participation over time as “assimilation into welfare” and 
decreased participation as “assimilation out of welfare”. In fact, Hansen and Lofstrom 
need to make this distinction because their findings for Sweden, which suggest 
assimilation out of welfare, are the exact opposite of previous findings for the US and 
Canada4. Although similar studies have yet to appear for Norway, similarities to 
Sweden politically and economically as well as very basic descriptive analysis of 
immigrants’ income makes assimilation out of welfare also seem likely in Norway.5  
Finally, welfare or social assistance is just one aspect of the social safety net in 
modern welfare economies. Participation in social insurance based on rights typically 
acquired by paying into the social insurance system over time is another area in which 
immigrants can become more similar, i.e. assimilate, to their native counterparts. Data 
for Norway, for example, indicate that there are proportionally fewer immigrants on 
disability insurance than in the general Norwegian population. However, the 
percentage of immigrants with disability insurance does increase with the time spent in 
the country, first and foremost due to larger numbers of immigrants acquiring the 
rights to such benefits through employment after several years in the country (Dahl, 
2002).  
A study of assimilation with respect to poverty propensity simply measures 
something different than labor market assimilation. It focuses on welfare for the lower 
end of the income distribution and for all individuals, regardless of their relationship 
with the labor market or the social insurance system. In end effect it combines 
elements from both studies of welfare participation and studies of wage assimilation, 
but, more importantly, it reflects the degree to which immigrants as a whole are able to 
                                                 
4 See Borjas and Trejo (1991) and Borjas and Hilton (1996) for analysis of the US and Baker and 
Benjamin (1995) for results from Cananda. 
5 Lie (2002), pp. 83-95, gives an overview of immigrants’ income components, also relative to their time 
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achieve at least the minimum necessary to participate in the life of their new home and 
avoid potential difficulties later on. This crucial distinction represents the main 
innovation of our approach. By having a look at how immigrants are faring with 
respect to a certain minimum in the society, we can better establish the extent to which 
more specific policies and programs with respect to immigration in general, labor 
market assimilation, social insurance or even welfare are needed. 
While the well-being of today’s immigrants appears to have its own place 
besides efficiency arguments in the general immigration debate in Norway, there is 
also an efficiency aspect involved in maintaining the welfare of immigrants. Immigrant 
groups with a persistently high probability of poverty, i.e. a lack of assimilation with 
respect to poverty probabilities over time, may bring with them any of a number of 
social woes generally associated with poverty for any group, native or immigrant, be it 
depressed neighborhoods, increased crime, stigmatization or social unrest. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a basic overview 
of the data, definitions and methods used to measure poverty in this study. It is 
followed by a section that gives a general picture of developments in immigration to 
Norway as well as the prevalence of poverty among immigrants to Norway by ethnic 
origin. The discussion in that section indicates the need for the more detailed logistic 
regression analysis presented in Section 4. That analysis focuses on the question of the 
impact of integration, measured very roughly as the number of years since migration, 
on the probability of being poor. The analysis based on annual income is also 
supplemented by an analysis of the situation with income over a three-year period. The 
final section, Section 5, discusses the findings, suggests possible interpretation and 
addresses some of the shortcomings and challenges presented by the analysis. 
 
2. Definitions, Methods and Data  
Construction of the relative poverty line used here was based on official data 
from the Norwegian national statistical office, Statistics Norway, and encompasses the 
entire resident population of Norway in each of the years 1995-1997. More 
specifically, we use a poverty line given at 50 % of median equivalent income after tax 
for the entire population in the relevant time period (one or three years) as described in 
more detail below. The logistic regressions performed later on in this paper to model 
immigrants’ and natives’ probabilities of poverty include only working age (16-68 
                                                                                                                                             
in the country. 
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years) persons who were not in education, but the classification as poor was based on 
calculations with the entire population. The main reason behind excluding groups such 
as the elderly, children and students lies with the fact that the income for these groups 
are determined by forces far different than those of the working age populations, i.e. 
the pension system, parents’ income, and education grants and loans. The income level 
of such groups is relevant in establishing a measure of the general income situation in 
the population, so they are included when determining the poverty line, but the 
different forces influencing their income level would present complications in isolating 
the effects of assimilation. These groups require a separate and very different approach 
if one wants to address the issue of their assimilation with respect to poverty. 
Use of data from the entire working age population of Norway makes it 
possible to obtain more reliable information than survey data, especially with regards 
to small groups. Survey data on groups that make up just a small portion of the 
population entail a large degree of uncertainty with respect to statistical results, and 
thus the ability to interpret any such results with confidence can be severely impaired. 
This is all the more true for immigrants, especially if one does not wish to treat them as 
a homogenous group, but would rather distinguish between immigrants of different 
ethnic origin, as we intend to do here. 
Although the individual will eventually constitute the unit of analysis, we first 
look at household income after tax (see Table 1) in order to later assign an income 
level to each individual based on household income allocated to household members 
according to two different equivalence scales. Income data is based on official income 
tax records and as such does not include income from sources like illegal employment 
and unpaid household work. In order to avoid potential distortions as a result of large 
losses on the stock market or negative income from self-employment, negative 
employment and/or capital income was set equal to zero before calculating total 
household income6. Interest payments on mortgages or other loans are not included in 
our income definition, neither is any attempt made to account for an income equivalent 
for the value of owner-occupied housing or other differences in purchasing power due 
to housing costs. 
                                                 
6 In 1997, 17,742 working-age persons were members of households with negative capital income and 
7,106 lived in households with negative labor income. Only 1.8% and 2.0% of those with negative 
capital income ended up with the classification as poor with the OECD equivalence scale and the 
square-root scale, respectively, in our analysis. (See below for a discussion of equivalence scales.) A 
much larger portion—approximately one-third—of those with negative labor income was classified as 
poor, but this group only accounted for 2.8% and 2.5% of the poor population with the OECD scale and 
square-root scale, respectively. 
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Table 1. Overview of income components 
 
Market income 
 
 
= Employment income 
 wages 
 income from self-employment 
+ Capital income, for example 
 interest 
 stock dividends 
 sale of stocks 
 
Total income = Market income 
+ Transfers, such as: 
 welfare 
 old-age pension 
 unemployment benefits 
 child allowance 
 student grants 
 
Income after tax = Total income 
- taxes and negative transfers 
 
We make use of two difference equivalence scales to compare households of 
various sizes. As equivalence scales make assumptions about the extent of the 
economies of scale within households, poverty analysis can be highly sensitive to the 
choice of equivalence scale. Our first scale, the square-root scale, assigns each 
household member an equivalent income by dividing total household income (after 
tax) by the square root of the number of household members. The second scale, the 
OECD scale, applies different weights to adults and children: the first adult receives 
weight 1, further adults the weight 0.7 and each child (under 16) the weight 0.5. Total 
income is then divided by the total weight for household members and the amount thus 
obtained is allotted to each member. All household members therefore receive the 
same equivalent income level regardless of who actually earned the income. It is on the 
basis of these equivalent incomes that we calculate the poverty line at 50 % of median 
equivalent income after tax in the (entire) population.  
As the example in Table 2 illustrates, the square-root scale entails larger 
economies of scales within a household than the OECD scale. The two scales can 
therefore lead to different and even conflicting results with respect to the relative level 
of poverty among certain groups in society. A Norwegian study of the sensitivity of 
poverty results with the use of different equivalence scales in conjunction with a 
relative poverty line given at 50% of median income indicates that the level of poverty 
in the entire population is generally larger when an equivalence scale with larger 
economies of scale is used (Lund and Aaberge, 1999). More importantly however, 
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certain demographic groups can be highly sensitive to the choice of equivalence scale 
depending in particular on the type of household composition prevalent in those 
groups. Use of two different equivalence scales will therefore be particularly useful in 
helping us establish which results are robust to such considerations.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of scale rates for two alternative equivalence scales  
Household income necessary for different households if each member is to receive an 
equivalent income of NOK 100 000. 
 
Square-root scale OECD scale Household 
composition weight income (NOK) weight income (NOK) 
1 adult 1,00  100 000 1,00 100 000 
1 adult, 1 child 1,41 141 000 1,50 150 000 
2 adults 1,41 141 000 1,70 170 000 
2 adults, 1 child 1,73 173 000 2,20 220 000 
2 adults, 2 children 2,00 200 000 2,70 270 000 
2 adults, 3 children 2,24 224 000 3,20 320 000 
  
 larger economies of scale 
 
 smaller economies of scale 
     
 
While use of data from the entire country makes the study of small immigrant 
groups possible, it also brings with it a complication that revolves around the 
increasingly large number of cohabitants in the Norwegian population. The above 
discussion about equivalence scales indicates the large part economies of scale can 
play in poverty analysis. Failure to correctly identify households’ composition can 
therefore lead to biases in poverty results. While cohabitant households with children 
can be identified in official Norwegian register data, identification of cohabitant 
households without children is not possible. As a result, cohabitants are registered as 
two separate single households in the database we use here.  
Åserud (2001) developed a method of predicting cohabitation in the Norwegian 
population in order to approximate the effect on the Norwegian income distribution in 
1997 and that method was implemented here. It should be noted that correct 
identification of cohabitants was not necessary as long as the ‘simulated’ cohabitant 
households resembled the true ones sufficiently to create a similar income distribution. 
Åserud’s study indicated that inclusion of cohabitant households should result in a 
decrease in inequality and poverty. The distribution created by our match-making 
methods did in fact result in the expected change in the Gini-coefficient and the Gini-
coefficient with our ‘simulated’ cohabitants was, in fact, not significantly different 
than that obtained by Åserud (2001), who was able to identify actual cohabitants for 
the sample of the population used in his study. Our data also exhibited the expected 
 8
reduction in poverty upon inclusion of cohabitant households (see Table 3)7. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Gini coefficient and percentage of poor in entire 
population with and without cohabitants as households8.  
 
 Square.-root scale OECD scale 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
Gini coefficient:       
Register family  
(cohabitants not as household) 0.256 0.254 0.258 0.240 0.241 0.245 
Household 
(cohabitants as household) 0.253 0.250 0.254 0.239 0.239 0.243 
       
Percentage of poor:       
Register family  
(cohabitants not as household) 7.8 7.1 6.8 4.3 3.9 3.9 
Household 
(cohabitants as household) 7.3 6.8 6.5 3.9 3.5 3.4 
 
   
 
3. A Brief Overview of Immigration and Poverty in Norway 
Immigration from non-Western countries is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Norway. Net immigration in Norway was, in fact, negative up until about the late-
1960s, and it was only after positive net immigration persisted for a number of years 
that any real restrictions on immigration were implemented in 1975. Due to similarities 
in language and culture as well as formal political agreements allowing for free 
movement—also for labor immigration—among the Nordic countries, large numbers 
of Nordic immigrants have been common for quite some time. Similarly, Norway’s 
involvement in the European Economic Area (EEA) also allows for free movement 
into the country for EEA-citizens. After 1975, immigration from non-EEA countries 
has been restricted to three main kinds: specialist (skills-based) labor immigration, 
family reunification, and political asylum. At the same time, large-scale immigration 
from non-Western countries first started in the early 1970s. In fact, as Table 4 
indicates, the number of non-Western and Eastern European immigrants surpassed 
Western immigrants only at the start of the 1990s. By the early 1990s, immigrants 
from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Turkey and South and Central America accounted 
for roughly one-half of the immigrant population.  
                                                 
7 Åserud (2001) used survey data on approximately 10,000 households from Statistics Norway to 
identify and then model the affinity for having a cohabitant with certain characteristics based, in 
particular, on level of education and age group. We used the estimated parameters from Åserud’s model 
together with address information to predict and simulate cohabitation in the official data on the entire 
population. Single women and men with the same address who best fit together according to the 
affinities based on Åserud’s estimates were then treated as cohabitants our study. 
8 Own calculations based on register data. Unless stated otherwise, tables and figures will be based on 
own calculations. 
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Table 4. Composition of the immigrant population of Norway by ethnic origin, 
total numbers and percent of immigrant population 
 
 Nordic countries Western Europe 
except Turkey 
Eastern Europe North America, 
Oceania 
Asia, Africa, South 
and Central 
America, Turkey 
 number percent* number percent* number percent* number percent* number percent* 
1970 26 548 44.8 15 190 25.7 5 806 9.8 8 103 13.7 3 549 6.0 
1980 31 210 32.8 22 686 23.8 7 114 7.5 11 810 12.4 22 382 23.5 
           
1986 35 766 29.0 28 503 23.1 8 868 7.2 11 332 9.2 38 879 31.5 
1987 37 880 28.9 28 797 22.0 9 374 7.1 11 320 8.6 43 771 33.4 
1988 39 509 27.0 29 420 20.1 10 639 7.3 11 350 7.8 55 379 37.9 
1989 40 037 25.0 29 972 18.7 11 878 7.4 11 292 7.0 67 114 41.9 
1990 38 089 22.6 29 107 17.3 13 551 8.1 10 769 6.4 76 782 45.6 
           
1995 40 608 18.9 28 853 13.4 30 276 14.1 10 211 4.7 105 100 48.9 
1996 41 643 18.6 29 188 13.0 33 200 14.8 10 037 4.5 109 729 49.0 
1997 43 696 18.8 29 491 12.7 34 486 14.9 9 879 4.3 114 640 49.4 
Source: Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no)  
* Percent of total immigrant population 
 
The extent to which immigrants have access to the same transfers and 
government-funded programs as natives varies according to the specific benefit or 
program. Child allowance is given to all families with children residing in Norway, 
regardless of their nationality and regardless of their earnings. Unemployment 
insurance benefits are granted on the basis of a person’s labor market history, and the 
same rules and rights are in place regardless of nationality. There are some slight 
differences with respect to disability and old-age pensions, which in part depend upon 
the number of years in the country9. Access to labor market programs through the 
employment office is generally along the same lines as for natives, and some programs 
are specifically intended for immigrants. All adult immigrants have access to free 
language instruction up to 850 classroom hours10. Refugees have the same access to 
educational grants and loans as natives. Although access to such funding is more 
limited for other immigrants, it is far from impossible. If, for example, an immigrant 
has worked full-time for a year before the commencement of studies, then he or she is 
eligible for the same educational grants and loans as natives.  
Table 5 uses cross-sectional data to illustrate the large differences in the 
percentages of poor in groups of different ethnic origin in the period 1995-199711. 
                                                 
9Disability and old-age pensions generally consist of two parts, a basic pension and a supplementary 
pension. Immigrants and natives are treated essentially the same with regards to the supplementary 
pension, the part of the pension which depends on the person’s earnings history. The basic (minimum) 
pension, however, depends on the length of the ‘insured period’, which for immigrants is the length of 
time in the country.  (For natives it is the length of time since age 16.) A 40 year ‘insured period’ is 
needed to get the full basic old-age pension.  
10 Up to 3000 hours for immigrants with no formal education. 
11 Table A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix provide an indication of the percentage of working age persons 
with even lower income—less than 25 % of median (equivalent) income after tax. While income that 
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Poverty seems to be a very prevalent phenomenon in the immigrant community in 
Norway, particularly among non-Western immigrants, but the estimates presented in 
Table 5 fail to take into account differences in age, education and type of household in 
the various ethnic groups. In addition, those figures are an average over various 
immigrant cohort groups. The high percentages may therefore be due to a large 
prevalence of poverty among immigrants who have just arrived recently while the 
incidence of poverty among more established immigrants may not differ greatly from 
that of the native population.  
 
Table 5. Percentage of poor in working age population* in Norway by ethnic 
origin 1995-1997 
                 Square-root scale                OECD scale 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
All 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.0 
By ethnic origin:       
Norway 3.7 3.4 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.2 
Nordic country 7.1 9.5 7.6 5.8 8.1 6.5 
Western country** 14.4 17.2 14.1 13.1 16.2 13.2 
Eastern Europe 23.3 20.2 17.3 22.4 19.8 17.0 
Asia (incl. Turkey) 22.3 20.2 18.8 23.5 22.3 20.9 
Africa 25.2 23.1 20.3 23.2 22.9 20.4 
South and Central American 16.4 16.8 13.9 13.8 14.3 12.4 
*Age 16-68, not in education 
**Western Europe (non-Nordic), North America, Australia and New Zealand 
 
 
Similarly, the picture presented in Figure 1 seems to suggest that just such a 
negative relationship between the percentage of poor immigrants and the length of 
time since their migration may exist, but, as already mentioned, it too may be very 
misleading if that negative relationship is largely due to changes in the demographic 
composition of the immigrants population over the course of the last few decades.  
 
 
Figure 1. The proportion of poor in working age population* in Norway in 1996 
by ethnic origin and number of years since migration.  Percent. 
                                                                                                                                             
low is extremely rare for natives, large percentage of immigrants do fall into this category for an annual 
measure of poverty, i.e. based on income from one year alone. However, Table A.5, which is based on 
income from a three-year period indicates that persistent income at such a very low level is also very 
rare among immigrants. (See subsection 4.2 below for a further discussion of chronic poverty, i.e. 
poverty based on income from several years.) 
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The logistic regressions based on cross-sectional data for 1997 presented in the 
next section can be viewed as an attempt to find some answers to the effect of what we 
shall very broadly refer to as integration or assimilation. Integration is, of course, a 
very diffuse and complicated concept which is difficult for the researcher to observe 
and even more difficult to measure, but it is reasonable to assume, as we do here, that 
the length of time the immigrant has spent in his or her new country provides a proxy 
for at least potential integration. Alternatively, the number of years since migration 
could be interpreted as experience and potential for investment in human capital in the 
new country and society, be it with respect to language, culture, the educational 
system, the labor market or the social security system.  
 
4. Prevalence of Poverty among Immigrants 
 
4.1 Poverty Defined in Terms of Annual Income 
The relationship between classification as poor and a number of person-related 
characteristics was modeled with the aid of logistic regressions. Due to the 
presumption of a very large degree of heterogeneity among immigrants groups of 
different ethnic origin, separate regressions were run for each of the groups. This 
allowed for the variables’ effects to vary greatly in the different ethnic groups on the 
one hand, but also resulted in a smaller number of observations and less accurate 
estimates for some of the groups on the other hand. Model parameter estimates are 
presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for both the square-root and OECD 
scales and some basic descriptive statistics on age and YSM are provided in Table A.3. 
The number of years since migration (YSM) does indeed have a significantly 
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negative effect on the probability of being poor, but the extent of the effect varies 
substantially across the different ethnic groups. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between YSM and the probability of being poor based on the regression coefficients 
presented in Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for married men without children at 
age 40, the average age of working age immigrants in Norway12. We present diagrams 
for four different levels of education in order to simultaneously examine the effect of 
education on the probability of being poor in the various ethnic groups. While the 
expected differences in poverty results for the two different equivalence scales as 
described in Section 2 suggest that the estimated effect of YSM may have a different 
magnitude for the different scales, inspection of the coefficient estimates show that at 
least the sign of the effect is robust with respect to the choice of equivalence scale. In 
addition, the diagrams in Figure 2 suggest that the magnitude of the effect of YSM as 
well as the relative differences between the ethnic groups with respect to education 
level are also very similar for the two equivalence scales.  
 
Figure 2. The probability of poverty by ethnic origin and level of education 
 
Square-Root Scale 
 
 
OECD Scale 
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12 See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for the probability of poverty relative to age. 
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The predicted probabilities are calculated with the following variables held constant: age 40 (average age of working 
age immigrants in Norway), couple without children, male.  
 
The diagrams in Figure 2 indicate that immigrant groups from Nordic 
countries, non-Nordic western countries, Africa, South and Central America and 
Eastern Europe all exhibit a strongly downward sloping relationship between YSM 
and the probability for being poor with a large degree of convergence towards the 
poverty level for natives. The curves cannot be said to converge entirely to the level of 
natives, except perhaps in the case of Nordic immigrants. Asian immigrants stand out 
as the group for which YSM has relatively little effect on the probability of being poor. 
African immigrants generally have a low predicted probability of being poor, but in 
light of that group’s small size and the large standard deviations associated with the 
estimates for that group (see Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix), caution should be 
exercised in interpreting those results. Nordic immigrants are most similar to their 
native Norwegian counterparts shortly after arrival and their probability of being poor 
converges relatively quickly a level similar to that of the native population. In light of 
the large degree of similarity in language, human capital and culture among the Nordic 
countries, one would expect that such immigrants face very little integration or 
assimilation difficulties and, hence, that just such a picture would emerge. This leaves 
the seemingly lack of a strong effect of YSM among Asian immigrants as the anomaly 
in this context, a topic which will be considered in greater detail in light of the general 
discussion and interpretation of results in the following discussion section. 
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Finally, it is also interesting to note that the differences between the groups in 
terms of the (starting) level of poverty probability seem to be smaller for higher 
education levels and that the groups converge more quickly to a common level for 
immigrants (excluding Asian immigrants) for higher education levels than for the 
lower ones. In particular, immigrants from different ethnic groups with a very high 
level of education (second level higher education degree) exhibit only small 
differences in the probability of being poor, while there is a large degree of dispersion 
in the probability of being poor for immigrants of different ethnic origin with a low 
level of education. This suggests that education leads to a certain degree of similarity 
between groups from the onset or very early on, that is, before or shortly after they 
arrive in Norway.      
 
4.2 Poverty Defined in Terms of Three-Year Income 
In a previous study of poverty in Norway, Aaberge et al. (1999) pointed out 
that annual income might not provide the best method of measuring (income) poverty. 
Annual results fail to consider the issues of transitions into and out of poverty as well 
as poverty duration. If, for example, many of the persons classified as poor based on 
annual income experience only temporary stints of poverty, then the annual measure 
may exaggerate poverty results both in extent and severity. Within this context, 
persistent low-income over several years constitutes a far greater threat to welfare than 
short-term income fluctuations that may lead to a classification as poor in one 
particular year.   
The same income definition as above is used in this section, but the time period 
is extended from one to three years: in other words, individuals are considered 
chronically poor if their equivalent income after tax for the entire three-year period 
1995-1997 lies below 50 % of the median for that period. As with the annual results 
presented above, the poverty line was first constructed based on the population of all 
persons residing in Norway during the relevant period, but the population used in later 
regressions will be that of working-age persons not in education.  
Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that the percentage of chronically poor as well as 
the effect of the move from annual income to three-year income varies across ethnic 
groups. Also in this case the native Norwegian population seems to fare best: very few 
natives are chronically poor and almost half of the poor in the native population in any 
given year are not considered chronically poor when income from several years is used 
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to define the poverty line. A large portion of annual poverty in the native population 
can, thus, be attributed to income fluctuations that may not have a highly detrimental 
effect on welfare in the long run. Immigrants tend to have a higher proportion of 
chronically poor in their ranks than natives and fewer of the immigrants registered as 
poor with an annual measure in a given year escape classification as chronically poor.  
 
Table 6. Percentage of chronically poor in working age population* in Norway 
by ethnic origin  
                 Square-Root Scale                OECD Scale 
 2,8 1,8 
Norway 2.4 1.3 
Nordic country 3.9 2.8 
Western country** 7.5 6.3 
Eastern Europe 15.2 13.8 
Asia (incl. Turkey) 15.9 14.8 
Africa 16.6 12.8 
South and Central American 11.0 7.8 
*Age 16-68, not in education 
**Western Europe (non-Nordic), North America, Australia and New Zealand 
 
Table 7. Percentage of persons classified as poor in a given year who are not 
classified as chronically poor based on total income after tax for the entire three-
year period.  
 
Square-Root Scale OECD Scale  
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
Norway 48.4 40.3 46.9 51.6 42.7 47.9 
Nordic country 49.3 30.8 33.6 50.6 29.7 31.4 
Western country** 36.1 21.6 27.0 34.8 21.1 25.8 
Eastern Europe 42.8 28.5 29.7 45.5 34.1 33.7 
Asia (incl. Turkey) 38.6 25.4 29.9 45.6 37.3 40.1 
Africa 42.8 28.6 28.5 45.3 34.7 35.6 
South and Central American 39.6 31.7 32.4 38.3 28.8 32.1 
*Age 16-68, not in education 
**Western Europe (non-Nordic), North America, Australia and New Zealand 
 
Figure 3, which is based on the estimated coefficients presented in Table A.6 
and A.7 in the Appendix, indicates that a negative relationship between YSM and the 
probability of chronic poverty also exists, although the slopes of the curves appear to 
be flatter than with an annual measure of poverty. In this respect it should however be 
noted that, due to the definition of chronic poverty used here, the population consists 
of only those immigrants who were in the country all three years 1995-1997. Hence, 
immigrants with YSM less than three could not be included in this analysis. This may, 
in part, account for the lower starting points for the curves in Figure 3 compared with 
those in Figure 2. Nonetheless, that alone cannot account for the differences between 
the figures: the effect of income fluctuations and the differences between the various 
ethnic groups in that regard must also play a part. 
Comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 also shows that the move from an annual 
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measure of poverty to a chronic one influences results for immigrants with lower 
education levels the most. That suggests that immigrants with lower education levels 
may often experience short-term stints of poverty, but nonetheless escape poverty 
when a longer accounting period is used as the basis for defining poverty. The curves 
for immigrants with higher education levels exhibit such an effect to a far lesser extent. 
The relative importance of the effect as we move from an annual to a chronic measure 
also varies greatly across ethnic groups. 
 
Figure 3. The probability of chronic poverty by ethnic origin and level of education 
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The predicted probabilities are calculated with the following variables held constant: age 40 (average age of working age immigrants in 
Norway), couple without children, male.  
 
In order to help establish just what sort of income factors are important in 
raising some households above the poverty line, Figure 4 compares the income 
composition of the chronic poor with that of those individuals just above the poverty 
line (i.e. with an income level between 50 and 60 percent of median equivalent income 
after tax over a three year period) for natives and immigrants by ethnic origin. The 
different ethnic groups vary greatly in their average income composition, but, in 
general, labor income is the largest income source. Transfers do, however, make up a 
very large part of total average income, and, in the case of non-Western immigrant 
groups, account for nearly as much as labor income. That does lend support to our 
claim that focusing on wage assimilation may not provide the whole story with regards 
to the welfare assimilation of immigrants, i.e. the extent to which immigrants are able 
to avoid very low levels of income in a manner similar to natives. Labor income and 
the type of assimilation that occurs with respect to wages has an undeniably large 
effect, but Figure 4 demonstrates that it may not be the only relevant factor. 
 
Figure 4. Income Composition over Three Years of the Chronic Poor Compared 
to Individuals Just Over the Chronic Poverty Line* 
 18
-5
0,
00
0
0
50
,0
00
10
00
00
15
00
00
20
00
00
25
00
00
Norwegian
Nordic
Western
E European
Asian
African
S/C American
poo
r
50-
60%
 of m
edia
n
poo
r
50-6
0% 
of m
edia
n poo
r
50-
60%
 of m
edia
n poo
r
50-
60%
 of m
edia
n
poo
r
50-6
0% 
of m
edia
n
poo
r
50-6
0% 
of m
edia
n poo
r
50-
60%
 of m
edia
n
In
co
m
e 
ov
er
 3
 y
ea
rs
mean of labor_income mean of capital_income
mean of transfers mean of taxes
 
*Individuals with equivalent income after tax between 50 and 60 percent of the median. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
The results in the preceding section suggest three main questions: why might a 
negative relationship between YSM (years since migration) and the probability of 
poverty exist, why might the extent of that effect vary across ethnic groups and, 
finally, what might our findings fail to take into account? In exploring these questions 
we would like to also keep in mind the seemingly weak YSM effect for Asian 
immigrants. 
Some of the possible reasons for the observed negative relationship between 
YSM and the probability of being poor will surely lie with the labor market 
participation of immigrants. As mentioned in the introduction, studies on the 
assimilation of immigrant wages relative to the native population suggest that some 
assimilation does take place, that is, that immigrants’ wages do, after a sufficiently 
long period in the country, increase relative to the wages of natives. Such growth in 
wages relative to the native population may raise some immigrants (and their 
households) out of poverty after a certain amount of time. In addition, the labor market 
participation of immigrants may increase over time either through lower 
unemployment or by means of more immigrants actually pursuing employment. While 
the relationship from improved labor market income, either through rising relative 
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wages or increased labor market participation, and lower incidence of poverty is more 
or less a direct one, it is nonetheless difficult to ascertain the actual mechanisms 
leading to higher relative wages and/or labor market participation. Borjas (1994) points 
out the importance language acquisition has been given in the literature attempting to 
explain some sort of difference in human capital accumulation between immigrants 
and natives as the mechanism underlying wage assimilation. Borjas also notes that 
while many of these studies indicate very large returns to language capital for 
immigrants, they often fail to take into account the potential selection bias in acquiring 
language proficiency in the first place, that is, that high-wage workers may simply 
have or quickly acquire better language skills, not vice versa.  
However, as emphasized in the introduction, human capital accumulation and 
labor market performance are far from the only aspects that enter into poverty analysis. 
The tax and social security system can also have a direct influence on immigrants’ 
income and, hence, the probability of being poor via tax deductions, universal transfers 
and means-tested programs as well as indirectly by means of labor market and 
educational programs with long-term returns. Moreover, the tax and social security 
system of any country may be difficult even for natives to understand, never mind 
immigrants who face difficulties with the language and culture. After some time in the 
country, immigrants may be better able to understand and benefit from the various 
programs available. In addition, even if immigrants have problems on the labor market, 
participation in temporary, part-time or low-paying jobs may nonetheless help them 
obtain rights to such benefits as unemployment and disability insurance as well as 
loans and stipends for education or other means of accumulating human capital; at the 
same time, once immigrants do manage to obtain steady employment with wages that 
raise them above the poverty line, the rights they have earned through such 
employment can prevent them from falling back into poverty in the event of 
unemployment, sickness or simply old-age. 
The effects of the two aforementioned aspects—labor market participation and 
eligibility and participation in the tax and social security system—may also differ 
across the various immigrant groups. As already indicated with respect to Nordic 
immigrants, certain groups will be expected to have little adjustment problems from 
the start. Hence, their labor market performance would be expected to be better from 
the onset implying that their starting probability of being poor would be lower and the 
effect from addition years in the country less. Other groups may start out at a very high 
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level due to initial difficulties that are easily overcome over time. That scenario fits in 
well with the picture for Eastern European immigrants, who start off at a very high 
probability of being poor, but experience a rapid decrease in the probability of poverty 
over time. The formal and cultural ties to these countries were for obvious historical 
reasons less developed than the ties with Western Europe and, hence, one would 
expect that that group would experience initial difficulties. At the same time, that 
group certainly shares in what could be considered a common European background. 
Hence, they would be expected to have less trouble in overcoming initial difficulties 
than other groups with far less in common culturally and could, therefore, be more 
successful in raising their income above the poverty line. 
In addition, immigrant groups may differ in the networks and ties they form 
within their respective ethnic communities. Such networks could conceivably have 
both a negative and a positive effect on the probability of being poor. On the one hand, 
strong ethnic communities may assist new arrivals in understanding how to function in 
their new environment. Ethnic community networks may provide channels by which to 
transfer information on available jobs and opportunities or, in the case of very large 
groups, the ethnic community may itself even constitute a source of employment for 
compatriots in ethnic-owned businesses. Within the American context, Borjas and 
Hilton (1996) show that immigrants’ participation in welfare programs often exhibit 
patterns along ethnic lines and suggest that ethnic communities may transmit 
knowledge of certain types of benefits to new arrivals. On the other hand, the presence 
of strong ethnic communities may hinder language acquisition or the incentive to 
interact with the larger native community. 
All of the above-mentioned factors—labor market performance, social security 
benefits and the existence and activity of ethnic networks—can have contributed to the 
relatively flat curve for Asian immigrants in Figure 2. Immigrants from Pakistan and 
Vietnam constitute two of the largest immigrants groups in Norway and are, in 
addition, two of the non-Western groups that have been in the country in substantial 
numbers the longest. As such, these groups would be good candidates for strong ethnic 
community networks, with all of the potential effects described above. Several 
different scenarios are possible: new arrivals from Asia may by themselves have a 
much higher probability of being poor, but help from the ethnic community prevents 
them from becoming poor early on. This could also be the case if large numbers of 
new arrivals come as family members and therefore join households made up of 
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immigrants with longer ‘experience’ in Norway and a lower probability of being poor. 
That suggests that the ‘true’ curve for Asian immigrants might start at a much higher 
level and then have a steeper slope than we can observe. The effect of YSM might, in 
other words, exist as immigrants become more self-sufficient and less reliant on aid 
from their ethnic community, but that might not be observable in our data. Strong ties 
within such ethnic communities might, however, also lead to a situation in which the 
immigrants largely stay within their own communities and do not gain the skills and 
knowledge they need to improve their income and escape from poverty.  
Another possible scenario also brings up a major drawback or possible 
shortcoming of our analysis. The cross-sectional nature of our data may mean that the 
curves presented in Figures 1 and 2 do not represent assimilation effects at all or only 
to a far lesser degree than suggested by the graphs. They might instead reflect 
differences in cohort groups over time. In other words, the immigrants who arrived 20 
years ago may have in some important ways been better suited to succeed in their new 
environment and therefore even at the time of their arrival had a lower probability of 
poverty. Such a possible deterioration of cohort quality may also have taken place to a 
lesser or greater extent in different ethnic groups, thus explaining the differences in the 
slopes of the curves in Figures 1 and 2. Differences in the economic climate at the time 
of arrival might also have contributed to differences in the probability of poverty for 
different cohort groups.  
In a similar manner, it could be argued that non-random selection effects may 
also have an impact on our results. The low probability of poverty among what is 
essentially earlier immigrant cohorts may reflect a situation in which only successful 
immigrants remained in Norway, while unsuccessful immigrants—those that were 
unable to raise their standard of living above a certain level such as the poverty line—
returned to their native countries or went elsewhere. In other words, the immigrants 
from earlier cohort groups that still turn up in our data may represent a non-random 
positive selection of the immigrants that entered the country at earlier dates versus 
more recently.  
A Norwegian study of the migration behavior of immigrants to Norway (Tysse 
and Keilman, 1998) suggests that the potential for such self-selection is, however, 
small among non-Western immigrants13. Table A.8 in the Appendix provides results 
                                                 
13 The potential for such self-selection appears greatest for Western immigrants, in other words, those 
immigrants that have the least problems from the start and, hence, are only of limited interest for this 
study. See Table A.8 in the Appendix. 
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from Tysse and Keilman (1998) with regards to the migration behavior as of 1996 
among 1986-1990-immigrant cohorts, a group highly relevant with respect to our data. 
Strikingly, the percentage of non-Western immigrants remaining in the country is 
largely unaffected by their employment status: 96% of employed immigrants from 
Eastern Europe as well as Asia, Africa and South and Central America remain in the 
country 5-10 years after initial immigration while over 97% of the unemployed 
immigrants from those same regions are also still residing in the country.14  
While the results we have presented here do for the most part suggest a 
negative relationship between the length of time in Norway and immigrants’ 
probability of being poor, they also suggest a number of questions for further research. 
With time we will be able to track the same immigrants as a panel with a longer time 
series in order to attempt to separate the cohort effect from the true effect of increased 
assimilation. In addition, the actual mechanisms leading to the negative relationship 
need to be uncovered by looking more closely at how such issues as labor market 
performance, human capital accumulation, and transfers relate to immigrants’ 
probability of poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Migration out of the country occurs mostly for the categories “outside of the labor force” and 
“unknown”. According to Tysse and Keilman (1998), the former group largely consists of students, who 
we have already excluded from our analysis, while the latter group is to a large extent made up of 
immigrants with such a short duration of stay in Norway that they are never registered with any sort of 
employment status. The authors suggest that that asylum seekers refused asylum are a major group in 
this category. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Regression Results for Probability of Being Poor in 1997 by Ethnic Group. 
Square-root scale 
  
 
Natives 
 
 
Nordic 
 
 
Western 
 
Eastern 
European 
 
 
Asian 
 
 
African 
South or 
Central 
American 
Intercept   0.8160  0.2846 1.0879   1.0320      -0.0146    -2.0494     1.1454 
    (0.0621)  (0.3229)  (0.2638)    (0.2698)    (0.1643)     (25.5746)      (0.4771) 
        
Age   -0.2051  -0.1536 -0.1428  -0.1278     -0.0782    -0.0184    -0.1382 
   (0.00296)  (0.0153)  (0.0126)    (0.0114)   (0.00765)      (0.0186)      (0.0240) 
        
Age2 0.00217  -0.00198 0.00181 0.00167    0.00104   0.000349    0.00177 
  (0.000036)  (0.000184) (0.000150)  (0.000134)  (0.000093)    (0.000237)    (0.000297) 
        
Female   0.0969  -0.1243   0.0956   0.0321     -0.0500    -0.0471     0.0173 
   (0.00624)  (0.0276)  (0.0226)    (0.0235)    (0.0154)      (0.0362)      (0.0536) 
        
Single   1.2729  0.5977   1.1411   1.1515       1.2502     2.8526     1.4074 
    (0.0243)  (0.1074)  (0.0799)    (0.1435)    (0.0784)     (25.5724)      (0.1301) 
        
Couple, child    -0.7431  -0.3425   -0.7455  -0.4414      0.3316     1.1126    -0.5810 
under 7    (0.0272)  (0.1113)  (0.0834)    (0.1429)    (0.0759)     (25.5724)      (0.1405) 
        
Couple, child 7+   -1.7449  -0.8808  -0.6994  -0.6369     -0.4300     1.0115    -0.7538 
    (0.0303)  (0.1287)  (0.0880)    (0.1438)    (0.0782)     (25.5725)      (0.1573) 
        
Single mother,      1.5407  1.1521   0.6115   0.4714      0 .0846     1.5518     0.5393 
child under 7    (0.0294)  (0.1501)  (0.1752)    (0.1777)    (0.1063)     (25.5726)      (0.1901) 
        
Single mother,      0.0407  0.6978   0.6188 0.1019      -0.0627     1.2229    -0.0366 
child 7+    (0.0300)  (0.1446)  (0.1214)    (0.1632)    (0.0985)     (25.5728)      (0.1925) 
        
Single father   -0.5068  0.0977    0.2149   0.6123       0.1653     1.2593     0.0928 
    (0.0485)  (0.2294)  (0.1833)    (0.2258)    (0.1378)     (25.5731)      (0.3426) 
        
Other hh type   0.9000  -0.4343  - 0.6076  -1.1649      -0.5728   -10.3874    -0.3567 
    (0.1525)  (0.6493)  (0.4298)    (0.9242)    (0.4807)       (179.0)      (0.5732) 
        
Middle school      0.0182  0.1628   0.1077   0.4174     0.3845    -0.0447     0.1446 
or less    (0.0659)  (0.2302)  (0.2047)    (0.2069)    (0.0512)      (0.1363)      (0.2194) 
        
Education after    -0.2013  -0.1114  -0.2559   0.1011      -0.1547    -0.1741    -0.0849 
high school     (0.0199)  (0.1266)  (0.0966)    (0.1168)    (0.0636)      (0.1148)      (0.1694) 
        
College/university    -0.5299  -0.6826  -0.3085 -0.2456     -0.3169    -0.1833    -0.2917 
first degree    (0.0208)  (0.1486)  (0.0925)    (0.1304)    (0.0598)      (0.1172)      (0.1831) 
        
College/university    -0.5590  -0.4338  -0.5851  0.5554     -0.3196     0.4069    -0.3395 
second degree    (0.0274)  (0.1656)  (0.1050)    (0.1276)    (0.0736)      (0.1154)      (0.2201) 
        
Edu not available   1.3452  0.9121   0.9955   0.2663       0.5255     0.1503     0.6862 
    (0.0251)  (0.0789)  (0.0621)    (0.0721)    (0.0312)      (0.0644)      (0.1029) 
        
Years since  -- -0.0474  -0.0513  -0.0700     -0.0360    -0.1046    -0.0890 
migration 
(YSM)  (0.00991) (0.00828)    (0.0125)   (0.00745)      (0.0148)      (0.0231) 
        
YSM2 -- 0.000365  -0.00021 -j0.00013  0.000255    0.00142   0.000790 
  (0.000275) (0.000234)  (0.000370)  (0.000250)    (0.000483)    (0.000754) 
        
Number of 1 337 022 34 371 22 812 16 493 36 583 8 358 4 660 
observations        
        
 25
Standard deviation listed in parentheses. 
The following categories are references for dummy variables: household type—couple, no children; education—high 
school. 
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Table A.2. Regression Results for Probability of Being Poor in 1997 by Ethnic Group. 
OECD scale 
  
 
Natives 
 
 
Nordic 
 
 
Western 
 
Eastern 
European 
 
 
Asian 
 
 
African 
South or 
Central 
American 
Intercept   -0.2388    0.1880   1.0242    0.2153   -0.5572    -2.7634     1.4103 
    (0.0695)     (0.3414)    (0.2663)    (0.2693)    (0.1582)   (25.4330)    (0.4850) 
        
Age   -0.1589   -0.1512  -0.1453   -0.0925    -0.0651    0.00578    -0.1521 
   (0.00337)     (0.0162)    (0.0127)    (0.0114)   (0.00730)    (0.0181)    (0.0245) 
        
Age2   0.00165  0.00193 0.00184 0.00120 0.00086   0.000014    0.00188 
  (0.000041)   (0.000196)  (0.000151)  (0.000134)  (0.000089)  (0.000232)  (0.000306) 
        
Female    0.0406   -0.1218   0.0880    0.0172    -0.0376   -0.00889    -0.0217 
   (0.00693)     (0.0287)    (0.0227)    (0.0225)    (0.0142)    (0.0337)    (0.0536) 
        
Single    0.8306    0.3035   1.0207   0.7608     0.8239     2.3672     1.1244 
    (0.0258)     (0.1102)    (0.0858)    (0.1453)    (0.0792)   (25.4309)     (0.1357) 
        
Couple, child    -0.2476   -0.1552   -0.5515    0.1449     0.1519     1.6365    -0.1347 
under 7    (0.0270)     (0.1117)    (0.0882)    (0.1424)    (0.0755)   (25.4308)    (0.1382) 
        
Couple, child 7+   -1.1367   -0.5322   -0.4213   0.00808     0.1859     1.5233    -0.3729 
    (0.0289)    (0.1263)    (0.0918)    (0.1428)    (0.0769)   (25.4309)    (0.1545) 
        
Single mother,     1.0337    0.9397    0.4492    0.0194    -0.2719     1.1236     0.0789 
child under 7    (0.0337)    (0.1573)    (0.1847)    (0.1912)    (0.1130)   (25.4311)    (0.2177) 
        
Single mother,    -0.1218    0.5284   0.6886    0.0264    0.2082     1.1819    -0.1330 
child 7+    (0.0330)    (0.1543)   (0.1269)    (0.1676)    (0.1007)   (25.4312)    (0.2109) 
        
Single father   -0.5816    0.1218    0.0947    0.2479     0.0358     1.2178    -0.0526 
    (0.0538)    (0.2392)    (0.1971)    (0.2468)    (0.1420)   (25.4316)    (0.3793) 
        
Other hh type    1.0034   -0.3016   -0.7597   -0.9983    -0.4441   -10.2292    -0.2104 
 
   (0.1560)    (0.6513)    (0.4719)    (0.9231)    (0.4806)     (178.0)    (0.5738) 
        
Middle school or     0.0770   -0.0145    0.1353    0.4189     0.5696     0.1810     0.2437 
less    (0.0792)    (0.2755)    (0.2066)    (0.2130)    (0.0460)    (0.1179)    (0.2267) 
        
Education after    -0.2285    0.0937   -0.3127    0.1221    -0.2128    -0.1924    -0.0217 
high school     (0.0230)    (0.1337)    (0.1021)    (0.1193)    (0.0601)    (0.1111)    (0.1743) 
        
College/university    -0.6389   -0.6521   -0.2453   -0.2651    -0.4172    -0.3227    -0.1772 
first degree    (0.0245)    (0.1627)    (0.0929)    (0.1342)    (0.0580)    (0.1152 )    (0.1852) 
        
College/university    -0.5652   -0.5007   -0.636   -0.6106    -0.4430     0.2890    -0.5026 
second degree    (0.0307)     (0.1882)    (0.1098)    (0.1327)    (0.0723)    (0.1111)    (0.2495) 
        
Not available    1.4524    0.9663   0.9986   0.3409     0.6652     0.2747     0.5843 
    (0.0275)    (0.0886)    (0.0630)    (0.0729)    (0.0292)    (0.0603)    (0.1094) 
        
Years since  -  -0.0604   -0.0479   -0.0735    -0.0121    -0.0671    -0.0958 
migration 
(YSM)     (0.0106)   (0.00842)    (0.0125)   (0.00706)    (0.0141)    (0.0242) 
        
YSM2 - 0.000581  -0.00038  0.000093   -0.00006 0.000839   0.000883 
   (0.000299)  (0.000243)  (0.000387)  (0.000236)  (0.000461)  (0.000810) 
        
Number of 1 337 022 34 371 22 812 16 493 36 583 8 358 4 660 
observations        
        
Standard deviation listed in parentheses. 
The following categories are references for dummy variables: household type—couple, no children; education—high 
school.  
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Figure A.1. The probability of poverty by age and ethnic origin 
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The predicted probabilities are calculated with the following variables held constant: YSM=10 for immigrants, couple 
without children, male, high school education.  
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Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics on Age, Years since Migration and Age at Migration 
by Ethnic Group in the Working Age Population 
 
      Age     Years since 
    Migration 
   Age at 
     Migration* 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Norwegian 42.6 13.1 - - - - 
All immigrants 40.2 12.0 13.9 10.5 26.3 9.8 
Immigrants by ethnic group:       
Nordic  44.0 12.4 17.7 12.6 25.3 9.1 
Western  44.7 11.9 17.7 12.2 26.9 8.9 
Eastern European 40.1 12.1 9.9 9.4 30.2 11.7 
Asian 36.7 10.6 12.0 7.2 24.7 9.8 
African 35.6 10.0 11.1 7.8 24.5 8.0 
South or Central American 38.6 10.9 12.3 7.4 26.3 9.3 
*Age at migration is age-YSM-1, due to the fact that the first year in the country counts as one year. 
    
 
 
Table A.4. Percentage of working age population* with income under 25 
percent of annual median equivalent income after tax in Norway by ethnic 
origin. 1995-1997.  
                 Square-root scale                OECD scale 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
All 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 
By ethnic origin:       
Norway 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Nordic country 2.8 3.8 3.2 2.6 3.5 2.9 
Western country** 9.0 11.4 9.3 8.6 11.1 9.0 
Eastern Europe 8.9 6.8 5.3 8.6 6.4 5.0 
Asia (incl. Turkey) 7.8 7.0 6.2 7.4 6.8 6.0 
Africa 10.4 9.7 8.0 9.6 9.1 7.4 
South and Central American 6.8 6.8 5.6 6.2 6.4 5.1 
*Age 16-68, not in education 
**Western Europe (non-Nordic), North America, Australia and New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5. Percentage of  working age population* in Norway under 25 percent 
of median three-year equivalent income after tax by ethnic origin. 1995-1997.  
 Square-root scale OECD scale 
All 0.1 0.1 
By ethnic origin:   
Norway 0.1 0.1 
Nordic country 0.5 0.5 
Western country** 1.7 1.6 
Eastern Europe 1.1 1.0 
Asia (incl. Turkey) 1.3 1.2 
Africa 1.8 1.7 
South and Central American 1.0 0.9 
*Age 16-68, not in education 
**Western Europe (non-Nordic), North America, Australia and New Zealand 
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Table A.6. Regression Results for Chronic Poverty by Ethnic Group. Square-root scale 
  
 
Natives 
 
 
Nordic 
 
 
Western 
 
Eastern 
European 
 
 
Asian 
 
 
African 
South or 
Central 
American 
Intercept   -0.4400      0.2702    1.5856   -0.3540     0.0976    -0.3069      1.4899 
    (0.0783)     (0.4890)    (0.3708)   (26.9209)    (0.1847)   (33.6099)    (0.5920 
        
Age   -0.1690     -0.2002   -0.1965   -0.1179    -0.0931    -0.1093     -0.1606 
   (0.00376)     (0.0228)    (0.0176)    (0.0134)   (0.00895)    (0.0224)    (0.0288) 
        
Age2   0.00186     0.00249   0.00227   0.00160    0.00119    0.00129     0.00203 
  (0.000045)  (0.000262)  (0.000205)  (0.000158)  (0.000109)  (0.000286)  (0.000348) 
        
Female    0.0273     -0.1564    0.0996    0.0175    -0.0314    -0.0221      0.0431 
   (0.00823)     (0.0435)    (0.0325)    (0.0265)    (0.0182)    (0.0451)    (0.0664) 
        
Single    1.0539      0.9067    1.1081    2.1216     0.8651     2.3202      1.2242 
    (0.0281)     (0.1587)    (0.1175)   (26.9195)    (0.0746)   (33.6075)    (0.1570) 
        
Couple, child    -0.7803     -0.5331   -0.7359    1.1982    -0.2922     1.0694     -0.8572 
under 7    (0.0334)     (0.1739)    (0.1263)   (26.9195)    (0.0712)   (33.6075)    (0.1869) 
        
Couple, child 7+   -1.9556     -1.3455   -0.6311    0.8748    -0.4167     0.8206     -0.8786 
    (0.0373)     (0.2060)    (0.1268)   (26.9195)    (0.0738)   (33.6076)    (0.1944) 
        
Single mother,     1.4840      1.4288    0.6796    1.7142    -0.2399     1.3503      0.4291 
child under 7    (0.0360)     (0.2250)    (0.2258)   (26.9198)    (0.1174)   (33.6077)    (0.2230) 
        
Single mother,     0.1560      0.8248    0.7230    1.6005    -0.1771     1.3460     -0.1320 
child 7+    (0.0349)     (0.2082)    (0.1591)   (26.9197)    (0.1019)   (33.6078)    (0.2240) 
        
Single father   -0.3906     -0.6531   -0.0941    1.3672    -0.1291     1.4376     -0.2030 
    (0.0568)     (0.4669)    (0.2805)   (26.9212)    (0.1524)   (33.6081)    (0.5497) 
        
Other hh type    1.2129     -0.1703   -0.7684  -10.0522     0.6040    -9.4036      0.6594 
 
   (0.1713)     (0.9059)    (0.6516)     (188.4)    (0.4195)     (235.3)    (0.6314) 
        
Middle school or     0.4200      0.6246    0.1506    0.5994     0.4200     0.0506     -0.0287 
less    (0.0670)     (0.2165)    (0.2352)    (0.2197)    (0.0551)    (0.1434)    (0.2459) 
        
Education after    -0.2827     -0.3793   -0.3388    0.1194    -0.1087    -0.3047    -0.0764 
high school     (0.0244)     (0.1672)    (0.1193)    (0.1374)    (0.0706)    (0.1359)    (0.1907) 
        
College/university    -0.8231     -0.6085   -0.3504   -0.4725    -0.3335    -0.2397     -0.1457 
first degree    (0.0283)     (0.1828)    (0.1127)    (0.1711)    (0.0695)    (0.1421)    (0.2059) 
        
College/university    -0.9373     -0.5472   -0.4696   -0.4489    -0.4295     0.5514     -0.3576 
second degree    (0.0401)     (0.2149)    (0.1227)    (0.1457)    (0.0907)    (0.1340)    (0.2551) 
        
Not available    1.6116      0.9373    0.9617    0.2981     0.5460     0.1649      0.6228 
    (0.0278)     (0.0925)    (0.0738)    (0.0865)    (0.0356)    (0.0735)    (0.1157) 
        
Years since  --     0.0181   0.00513   -0.1479    -0.0180    -0.0697     -0.0902 
migration 
(YSM)      (0.0158)    (0.0125)    (0.0158)    (0.0100)    (0.0202)    (0.0326) 
        
YSM2 --   -0.00123  -0.00148   0.00199   -0.00027   0.000701    0.000723 
  (0.000424)  (0.000346)  (0.000452)  (0.000338)  (0.000654)   (0.00102) 
        
Number of 1 201 241 18 203 17 464 13 443 28 795 6 201 3 754 
observations        
        
Standard deviation listed in parentheses. 
The following categories are references for dummy variables: household type—couple, no children; education—high school.  
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Table A.7. Regression Results for Chronic Poverty by Ethnic Group.  
OECD scale 
  
 
Natives 
 
 
Nordic 
 
 
Western 
 
Eastern 
European 
 
 
Asian 
 
 
African 
South or 
Central 
American 
Intercept    -0.9503    -0.2069    1.4874   -1.0727    -0.5146    -1.4977     1.5296 
    (0.0917)   (0.5461)   (0.3838)   (27.6067)   (0.1882)  (37.0847)    (0.6560) 
        
Age    -0.1538    -0.1827   -0.1917   -0.0897    -0.0732    -0.0569    -0.1624 
   (0.00451)   (0.0255)   (0.0183)    (0.0138)  (0.00914)   (0.0250)    (0.0317) 
        
Age2    0.00165    0.00230   0.00220   0.00124   0.000918   0.000584    0.00191 
  (0.000054) (0.000294) (0.000215)  (0.000164) (0.000112) (0.000323)  (0.000389) 
        
Female     0.0135    -0.1274    0.0912   0.00839    -0.0183    -0.0257   -0.00022 
   (0.00964)   (0.0476)   (0.0337)    (0.0265)   (0.0182)   (0.0477)    (0.0718) 
        
Single     0.7991     0.6887    0.9146    1.8502     0.6313     2.0877     1.0114 
    (0.0303)   (0.1756)   (0.1207)   (27.6052)   (0.0777)  (37.0821)    (0.1986) 
        
Couple, child     -0.3468    -0.2796   -0.5777    1.5277     0.0222     1.3542    -0.4372 
under 7    (0.0339)   (0.1857)   (0.1269)   (27.6052)   (0.0727)  (37.0821)    (0.2165) 
        
Couple, child 7+    -1.3249    -0.8928   -0.3696    1.4240     0.0280     1.0051    -0.1251 
    (0.0359)   (0.2117)   (0.1270)   (27.6052)   (0.0747)  (37.0822)    (0.2152) 
        
Single mother,      0.8820     0.9574    0.3479    1.4577    -0.6484     0.9867    -0.0150 
child under 7    (0.0448)   (0.2658)   (0.2508)   (27.6056)   (0.1376)  (37.0824)    (0.2949) 
        
Single mother,     -0.1409     0.7958    0.6071    1.3787    -0.3625     1.4494    -0.4412 
child 7+    (0.0411)   (0.2320)   (0.1693)   (27.6054)   (0.1120)  (37.0824)    (0.3061) 
        
Single father    -0.5704    -1.0436    0.0656    1.0575    -0.2201     1.3153    -0.9004 
    (0.0697)   (0.6407)   (0.2819)   (27.6077)   (0.1675)  (37.0829)    (0.9080) 
        
Other hh type     1.4901     0.1022   -0.6698   -9.8712     0.8363    -9.2282     0.9654 
    (0.1740)   (0.9094)   (0.6526)     (193.2)   (0.4208)    (259.6)    (0.6418) 
        
Middle school or      0.5404     0.5056    0.1542    0.5030     0.3898    -0.0532    -0.0772 
less    (0.0800)   (0.2530)   (0.2482)    (0.2529)   (0.0568)   (0.1625)    (0.2938) 
        
Education after     -0.2857    -0.3048   -0.2845    0.1626    -0.1275    -0.3017     0.0450 
high school     (0.0288)   (0.1903)   (0.1274)    (0.1526)   (0.0734)   (0.1516)    (0.2088) 
        
College/university     -0.8509    -0.4847   -0.3079   -0.4316    -0.3703    -0.2306     0.0994 
first degree    (0.0337)   (0.1966)   (0.1179)    (0.1904)   (0.0732)   (0.1563)    (0.2166) 
        
College/university     -0.9504    -0.5485   -0.5040   -0.4853    -0.4442     0.5746    -0.3799 
second degree    (0.0468)   (0.2443)   (0.1322)    (0.1642)   (0.0949)   (0.1422)    (0.2981) 
        
Not available     1.6093     0.9222    0.9167    0.3792     0.6371     0.2409     0.4990 
    (0.0322)   (0.1042)   (0.0780)    (0.0953)   (0.0365)   (0.0802)    (0.1341) 
        
Years since  --   0.00766  -0.00075   -0.1796    -0.0185    -0.0818    -0.1194 
migration 
(YSM)    (0.0179)   (0.0133)    (0.0167)   (0.0102)   (0.0217)     (0.0370) 
        
YSM2 --  -0.00130  -0.00152   0.00290   -0.00013    0.00130    0.00146 
  (0.000497) (0.000378)  (0.000484) (0.000347) (0.000711)    (0.00119) 
        
Number of 1 201 241 18 203 17 464 13 443 28 795 6 201 3 754 
observations        
        
Standard deviation listed in parentheses. 
The following categories are references for dummy variables: household type—couple, no children; education—high 
school. 
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Table A.8. 
Percentage of 1986-1990 Immigrant Cohorts Still Residing in Norway as of January 
1st, 1996 by Employment Status 
 
 Percentage residing in Norway as of January 1st, 1996
 
Number of
observations All Men Women
Employed  
Nordic 3 981 45.2 52.1 40.4
Western Europe 1 411 72.9 74.9 69.9
North America 393 61.1 54.7 68.7
Eastern Europe 1 136 96.0 95.7 96.3
Other regions 8 506 96.4 96.5 96.1
  
Unemployed  
Nordic 190 51.1 44.8 58.8
Western Europe 81 84.0 78.9 95.8
North America 25 76.0 75.0 76.9
Eastern Europe 330 97.3 97.4 97.0
Other regions 3 081 97.5 97.4 97.7
  
Not in labor force  
Nordic 3 238 18.3 17.4 18.9
Western Europe 1 957 31.1 28.9 32.9
North America 1 316 23.3 23.4 23.3
Eastern Europe 1 954 55.2 42.9 67.4
Other regions 13 531 77.0 70.6 84.7
  
Unspecified  
Nordic 3 960 1.7 1.7 1.7
Western Europe 1 195 2.8 3.1 2.4
North America 619 1.1 1.8 0.6
Eastern Europe 779 5.8 4.3 8.4
Other regions 3 174 36.2 34.8 39.1
Source: Tysse and Keilman (1998), Table 2.5.3.a and Table 2.5.3.b, p. 64. 
  
 
 
 
